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Abstract
We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of
contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call “public con-
tracts”) with contracts between non-governmental entities. We show that public contracts
are lengthier and have more rule-based rigid clauses; in addition, their renegotiation is
formalized in amendments. We also find that contract length and the frequency of rigidity
clauses increases in political contestability and closer to upcoming elections. We maintain
that the higher rigidity of public contracts is a political risk adaptation strategy carried
out by public agents to lower the likelihood of success of politically motivated challenges
from opportunistic third parties.
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Contracting is at the basis of every economic activity and has been an important subject
of study at law, economics, and business schools. Yet scant empirical studies have examined
contract features of large samples of contracts (Schwartz and Scott 2010).
Previous—mostly theoretical—works have focused on contract completeness (Schwartz
and Scott 2003; Shavell 2006), particularly contract interpretation. The cost of writing a
contract increases with the number of contingencies addressed in the contract (Dye 1985). In-
completeness arises endogenously from an insufficient description of the parties’ behavior (i.e.,
discretion) and insufficient contingency of the parties’ obligations to external states (Batti-
galli and Maggi 2002). The costs of designing optimal complex contracts can be prohibitively
expensive for the involved parties. Enforcing such contracts can also be costly. Therefore,
involved parties often prefer to use simple contracts (Schwartz and Watson 2004). A positive
correlation exists between complexity (e.g., measured by contract length) and the probability
that parties choose arbitration over court litigation (Drahozal and Ware 2010), with arbitration
being preferred for contracts with more “implicit” terms (Drahozal and Hylton 2003).
The empirical analysis of contracts presents two problems: the dearth of explanatory
variables and the subtle contract variations arising from the interaction of terms. A series of
contracting papers published beginning in the mid-1980s addressed these hindrances. Joskow
(1985, 1987) analyzed vertical integration, contract duration, and relation-specific investments
based on contracts between coal suppliers and electric utilities. Masten and Crocker (1985,
1988, 1991) examined the tradeoffs between the design and duration under price regulation and
the processes by which parties adjust prices in long-term contracts to encourage flexibility and
avoid opportunism in the production of onshore natural gas wells. Crocker and Reynolds (1993)
studied the optimal degree of contractual incompleteness in pricing procedures used in Air Force
engine procurement contracts. Lafontaine (1992, 1993) explored the determinants of franchise
agreements under risk sharing and moral hazard in various business activities. Masten and
Snyder (1993) analyzed the use of specific lease provisions to supply quality equipment without
the need for comprehensive contracting in the shoemaking industry. Leffler and Rucker (1991)
investigated the incentives associated with lump-sum (transaction costs-covering) and per unit
payment (risk-sharing) provisions in timber-harvesting contracts. Similarly, Allen and Lueck
(1992, 1993) looked at cash rent versus cropshare agricultural contracts. Yet these studies
focused on particular sectors, were geographically restricted, and were based on a limited
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number of observations.1 In most cases, contractual attributes were identified as dummy or
ordered variables.
Schwartz and Watson (2012) tackled the question of which institutional environment
demonstrates a preference for arbitration. Arbitration is less costly than court trials, but
requires more accurate contracts. These authors provided a model, supported by empirical ev-
idence using a large set of contracts filed through the Stock and Exchange Commission (SEC),
in which a welfare-maximizing enforcer induces the contracting parties to make socially effi-
cient trade-offs between interpretation accuracy and cost of contract writing—namely, between
the trial cost and investment in the deal.
Spiller (2008) and Moszoro and Spiller (2012) presented a complementary rationale for the
use of rule-based terms in public contracts. Public agents are subject to public overview and,
thus, political hazards (e.g., loosing credibility and office). Therefore, they choose rigid con-
tractual clauses to keep at bay plausible challenges from opportunistic third parties—political
opponents, competitors, and interest groups—who seek to undermine the incumbent public
agent’s position. Moreover, whereas private parties can engage in relational contracting, politi-
cians are subject to political cycles and periodic overviews (elections), thus public contracts
have to have clauses that survive their tenure in office.
There is vast anecdotical evidence about the higher convolutedness of public-sector pro-
cedures and practices compared to contracts between private-sector parties, but no compre-
hensive empirical study to this matter. We fill this gap with a novel dataset and methodology.
Our approach is similar to Schwartz and Watson (2012)2 in that we use the same data source
(SEC filings) and analogous algorithmic data reading, but our study differs in its controls,
treatment, and testable predictions. Using data scraping and word clustering from more than
200,000 contracts across all states and a wide variety of industries filed through the SEC’s
Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, we test Moszoro and
Spiller’s (2012) hypothesis of higher rigidity of public contracts compared with purely private
contracts.
1 With the exception of Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993), who collected an impressive survey of 1,628–3,432
agricultural contracts, and Lafontaine (1992, 1993), who relied on a cross-section of 548 contracts, these studies
were based on datasets that included from 44 to 299 observations.
2 The subsequent version of this paper (Schwartz and Watson 2013) lacked the empirical tests using SEC
filings.
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I A Model of Contractual Rigidity3
Public agents—politicians, civil servants, public-sector employees—are subject to third-party
overview because they play with public monies. A concern for the misuse of other people’s
monies makes an objection to a public contract—either formally in a court or informally
through the media—feasible. Therefore, public agents fear politically motivated challenges
from opportunistic third parties, although the awarding and performance of a public contract
may be honest and legal.
Contract rigidity refers to rule-based (bureaucratic) implementation aimed at minimiz-
ing politically motivated challenges; i.e., the addition of contractual provisions and specifi-
cations that impose ex post stiff enforcement, intolerance to adaptation, and penalties for
deviation. Thus, contract rigidity—although generally correlated with—differs from Arrow-
Debreu’s (1954) state-contingent contracts, which point to the ex ante complexity of the subject
and the completeness of the clauses, technical provisions, and processing costs (Laffont and
Tirole 1993). From the contractor’s perspective, contractual rigidity minimizes the risk of gov-
ernmental opportunism, i.e., unfair administrative treat and unfavorable renegotiations (e.g.,
creeping expropriation).
In Spiller (2008), the lack of discretion in public procurement design and implementation
reflects public agents’ political risk adaptation aimed at limiting the hazards from opportunistic
third parties. The associated contracting costs are externalized to the public at large. Following
Moszoro and Spiller (2012), we assume that public agents minimize both contracting and
political costs given by:
minimize
R
Φ = T0 ρ(R)τ(R) +K(R) (1)
whereK(R) is contracting costs rising exponentially with contract rigidity, ρ is the likelihood of
a challenge by an opportunistic third party and τ is the likelihood of success of an opportunistic
challenge (both decreasing with contract rigidity), and T0 is the public agent’s (political) cost
if a challenge by third parties is successful. Third parties observe benefits from opportunistic
challenge, but the public agent does not know ex ante the particular value of these benefits
for third parties. Third parties’ overall benefits from an opportunistic challenge correspond to
3 This section follows Moszoro and Spiller (2012).
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a random normally distributed variable T˜0.
Moszoro and Spiller (2012) showed that in equilibrium third parties challenge a contract
only if expected gains T˜0ζτ are greater than litigation costs c(R):
ρ ≡ Pr[T˜0ζτ(R) > c(R)], (2)
where ζ ∈ (0, 1] is a political concentration parameter: if ζ = 1, the opportunistic challenger’s
benefits are symmetrical to the incumbent public agent’s costs from an opportunistic challenge
(e.g., a two-party political market); if ζ < 1, the political market is fragmented and the
challenger does not internalize all benefits from a successful contract protest.
Litigation costs c(R) rise in R. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic
challenge, thereby lowering third parties’ expected gains and increasing litigation costs. Any
deviation from equilibrium rigidity R∗ makes the public agent worse off:
(a) If R < R∗, then τ(R) > τ(R∗), c(R) < c(R∗), therefore ρ > ρ∗ and T0 ρ(R)τ(R) −
T0 ρ(R
∗)τ(R∗) > K(R∗) − K(R) (political cost increase offsets gains in contracting cost
decrease)
(b) If R > R∗, then T0 ρ(R
∗)τ(R∗)−T0 ρ(R)τ(R) < K(R)−K(R
∗) (contracting cost increase
outmatches gains in political cost decrease)
Moszoro and Spiller (2012) derive two testable predictions on the contractual design de-
pending on the characteristics of the contracting parties:
Prediction 1 Equilibrium contract rigidity increases in political costs; thus, contracts subject
to public scrutiny show more rigidity clauses than purely private (i.e., relational) contracts.
Prediction 2 In the sub-sample of public contracts, rigidity increases with political contesta-
bility (high ζ).
II Data and Methodology
A SEC’s EDGAR Database
To test our predictions of higher rigidity of public contracts compared with purely private con-
tracts, we utilized a large number contracts filed through the SEC’s Electronic Data-Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system that cover across all states and a wide variety of
5
industries. All publicly traded companies operating in the U.S., both foreign and domestic,
are required to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronically
through the EDGAR system. The required disclosure filings made by publicly traded compa-
nies frequently contain contracts that are of material interest to investors. Filing requirements
for compliance with SEC’s regulations are described in Overdahl (1991).4 Although this in-
formation is available to the public, research on contracting has been stymied by a lack of
parametrization.5
We used the directEDGAR engine developed by Burch Kealey from the University of
Nebraska at Omaha to extract all data in Exhibit 10 from the 10-K filings filed from 1998 to
2013. The following subsections describe the data treatment step by step.
B Data Treatment
Step 1: Rough Data
An issuer must file an Exhibit 10 to a registration statement and periodically report “material
contracts” described in items 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K and Regulation S-B. Examples of
different types of material contracts include: asset purchase agreements, bridge loan agree-
ments, cash bonus plans, director fee agreements, director indemnification plans, employment
agreements, executive compensation plans and incentive plans, financial services agreements,
joint venture agreements, lease agreements, letters of intent, license agreements, pension plans,
profit sharing plans, purchase agreements, stock option agreements, stock purchase agreements,
and termination agreements.
We retrieved material contracts through directEDGAR, which collects data from the SEC’s
FTP server. The data in this system consists of electronic filings by corporations and individual
filers to the SEC.6 We used the form type index to identify Exhibit 10 documents included with
the filing of forms 10-K, which require the inclusion of material contracts, and then retrieved
each Exhibit 10 from the location indicated in the filing index.
4 A modern index to forms is available at: http://www.sec.gov/ info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf.
5 The Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI) based at the University of Missouri-
Columbia facilitates access to the EDGAR database. CORI’s K-Base library contains more than 690,000
contracts, but its query system only allows for individual downloads.
6 These filings are made available to the public through the EDGAR Dissemination Service. The EDGAR
indexes facilitate FTP retrieval by listing the following information for each filing: company name, form type,
Central Index Key (CIK), date filed, and file name (including folder path). In the “full-index” folder, year and
quarter subfolders contain these data fields sorted by company name, form type, and CIK number.
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We retrieved 206,677 contracts dated from 1998 to 2013 and translated all files to machine-
readable ASCII text format.7 To avoid computational errors due to code strings included in
the files, we measured contract length by the geometric average of the word count of three
common English words: “the”, “and”, and “of”. We then used the natural logarithm for file
length normalization.
Step 2: Company Identification
We identified each filing company by the SEC’s Central Index Key (CIK) and linked it to
the company’s ticker, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, location, and financial
characteristics retrieved from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).8 We dropped
26,282 filings to which no CIK or SIC code was associated.
Step 3: Public versus Private
We classified the contracts as “Utilities” and “Quasi-regulated” (i.e., where one public agency,
state, county, or municipality is involved) versus purely “Private” using the SIC code9 of the
filing party. Unfortunately, we were not able to identify non-reporting contractees.
(a) Filing companies whose SIC code begins with 6 (Finance) and 9 (Administration) were
filtered out.
(b) “Utilities”: filing companies whose SIC code is between 4900 and 4999—namely, electric,
gas and sanitary services, electric services, natural gas transmission, natural gas transmis-
sion and distribution, natural gas distribution, electric and other services combined, gas
and other services combined, water supply, sanitary services, refuse systems, hazardous
waste management, steam and air-conditioning supply,10 and cogeneration services and
7 Although EDGAR was launched in 1994, filings from early years are random and incomplete. To increase
the reliability of our data, we collected contracts from 1998 onwards.
8 See http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/cik.htm and http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
companysearch.html (accessed on September 24, 2012) for a list of CIK and SIC codes.
9 See, e.g., Matsumoto (2002) for a treatment of SIC codes regarding regulation. We modified his treat-
ment and classified companies whose SIC code is between 4800 and 4899 as “quasi-regulated industries”. See
http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (accessed on September 24, 2012) for the SIC Code List descrip-
tion.
10 For the sake of clarity, SIC code 4961: “Steam and Air-conditioning Supply” refers to utilities engaged
in the production and/or distribution of steam and heated or cooled air for sale, not to commercial and in-
dustrial air-conditioning equipment. Its equivalent NAICS Code is 221330. For a manual of SIC codes, see:
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic manual.html.
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small power producers.
(c) “Quasi-regulated industries”: filing companies whose SIC code is between 4000 and 4499
and between 4800 and 4899—namely, railroad switching and terminal establishments, local
and suburban transit, interurban highway passenger transportation, trucking and courier
services (no air), trucking (no local), public warehousing and storage, terminal maintenance
facilities for motor freight transport, water transportation, deep sea foreign transportation
of freight, telephone communications (no radiotelephone), telegraph and other message
communications, radio broadcasting stations, television broadcasting stations, cable and
other pay television services, and communication services.
(d) “Private”: filing companies whose SIC code starts with 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, or 8 or whose SIC
code is between 4500 and 4799.
Utilities provide and maintain the infrastructure for key public services—electricity, nat-
ural gas, water, and sewage. In the U.S., utilities are often natural monopolies because of the
high costs involved in developing the necessary infrastructure and limited in their geographical
scope. Due to their social impact, utilities are subject to forms of public scrutiny and regu-
lation ranging from local community-based groups to state-wide government monopolies. If
privately owned, these utility companies enjoy limited business autonomy and their activities
are specially regulated and subject to public scrutiny by a public utilities commission.11
We distilled 20,200 public contracts and 123,543 private contracts.12
Step 4: Word Count and Categorization
We used Schwartz and Watson’s (2012) keyword list of arbitration clauses—arbitration (and
variants), whereas, court, appeal, mediation, litigation, warranty, guaranty, specification, and
deposition—as the starting point and complemented the list with 21 keywords, grouped them
into seven rigidity categories: arbitration, certification, evaluation, litigation, penalties, termi-
nation, and design.
11 See Appendix A for an example of public scrutiny and accountability in the contracting practice at a water
utility.
12 We use the term “public” to describe contracts in which one of the parties is a utility and the term
“private” to describe contracts where the parties are non-utilities. This is not to be confused with publicly
traded versus privately held firms.
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In textual analysis, these categories are referred to as “dictionaries.” We used them to
hard code contractual clauses. Our use of categories is analogous to Parkhe’s (1993) in the
management literature, Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) in the finance and accounting litera-
ture, and Talley and O’Kane’s (2012) in the law and economics literature. In a small contract
sample, Parkhe (1993) used dummy variables equal to one when specific clauses—written re-
ports of relevant transactions, promptly written notice of departures from the agreement, the
right to examine and audit relevant records using a firm of certified public accountants, des-
ignation of certain information as proprietary and subject to confidentiality provisions of the
contract’s non-use of proprietary information even after termination of the agreement, termi-
nation of agreement, arbitration clauses, and lawsuit provisions—were contained in a contract.
Loughran and McDonald (2011) applied word counts of negative words, positive words, uncer-
tainty words, litigious words, strong modal words, and weak modal words in a large number of
SEC filings. (Talley and O’Kane 2012) used customized Boolean searches to identify “Material
Adverse Change” provisions in M&A agreements.
Arbitration clauses submit plausible disputes to an arbitrator instead of a court.13 Certi-
fication clauses regulates and bounds the contractor, e.g., the procedures the contractor needs
to follow or the type of subcontractors she may choose. Evaluation clauses introduce duties
regarding delivery. Litigation clauses appear in triggers to a lawsuit. Termination clauses
signal ways to resolve intractable contract disruption. Finally, design clauses impose product
or service features.
We conjecture, following Spiller (2008) and Moszoro and Spiller (2012), that these rigidity
categories capture relevant contractual clauses that lower the likelihood of a challenge by
opportunistic third parties. Our rationale for (and contribution to) the use of rigidity categories
instead of the use of a simple aggregate is to open the black box on contractual rigidity and
assess its magnitude and significance at a granular level.
We developed a keyword count by data scraping.14 Table 1 presents keywords univocally
13 Contracts submitting to arbitration have more details because there will be less deposition opportunities.
Public contracts may have more arbitration clauses to minimize the risks of (unfavorable) court decisions. Public
agents may also prefer arbitration because it is faster and more confidential than courts, so they are less exposed
to third parties.
14 Although word count is a brute form of textual analysis, it is unlikely that these words would be used in
a context expressing the opposite of their intended meaning; i.e., if the word “litigation” appears, it is unlikely
that it would be to derogate a termination clause (e.g., as in “this contract is not subject to litigation”).
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related to their corresponding categories. The choice of these particular words was the result
of consultations with law academics and partitioners, and several trial iterations to fine-tune
the dictionaries.
Overall, we recovered 5,644,668 keywords: arbitration 396,178; certification 872,843; evalu-
ation 1,304,934; litigation 289,750; penalties 773,392; termination 1,940,419; and design 67,152.
Step 5: Descriptive Categories
We scraped keywords contained in the first 100 lines of the filings to identify the type of
contract, as presented in Table 2. We identified these types for 126,913 filings: amendment
96,552; commercial contracts 54,344; compensation/employment 88,238; consulting 4,559; and
finance 50,492. This categorization is not unique for each contract, meaning our identified
categories overlap. Indeed any type of contract may be subject to amendments.
Our focus is on commercial contracts. We adopted a cautious approach, in which we
identify as commercial contracts only those that do not share attributes with compensa-
tion/employment, consulting, or finance descriptive categories. Finally, we processed 7,190
commercial contracts, out of which we identified 1,808 as license contracts and 5,382 as
sale/procurement contracts.15
Our identification of amendments by keywords in the document heading may capture pri-
mary contracts with an “integration” (also known as “merger” or “entire agreement”) clause.16
Integrated agreements, however, are a formal amendment for the purposes of this research and
does not confound our results.
Table 3 presents the summary of the dataset construction step by step, and Tables 4 and
5 present the characterization and summary statistics of the output dataset of commercial
contracts.
15 These contracts are common agreements related to the ongoing business activities, not only one-time
events as, for example, the construction of a generation plant for an electric utility.
16 An example of an integration clause is provided below:
This is the entire agreement between the parties. It replaces and supersedes any and all oral
agreements between the parties, as well as any prior writings. Modifications and amendments to
this agreement, including any exhibit or appendix, shall be enforceable only if they are in writing
and are signed by authorized representatives of both parties.
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III Contract Features and Hypotheses
The contract features that we use as proxies of complexity are: length, clusters of rigidity
clauses, and number of amendments to contracts. Descriptive categories are used as control
variables. We were unable to extract the duration and value of the contracts.
We advance the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Public contracts are lengthier than private contracts.
Hypothesis 2 Public contracts have more rigidity clauses than private contracts.
Hypothesis 3 Public contracts are renegotiated through formal processes and, thus, have more
amendments than private contracts; in addition, public contracts’ amendments include more
rigidity clauses than private contracts’ amendments.
Figure 1 maps these hypotheses graphically.
Figure 1: Graphical representation of hypotheses and research approach.
Rule-based, 
rigid contracts
Formal 
renegotiations
[H3a]
Amendments
[H1]
Length
[H2, H3b] 
Rigidities 
arbitration, 
certification,  
evaluation, 
litigation, 
penalties, 
termination,
design
Notes: We compare public and private contract by length (H1), the frequency of appearance of rigidity
clauses (H2), and average number of written amendments to a contract (H3a) and frequency of rigidity
clauses in these amendments (H3b).
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IV Identification Strategy
As “predictors” of complexity of public contracts, we use length (Hypothesis 1) and frequency
of rigidity clauses (Hypothesis 2). We tested these hypotheses with OLS regressions for contract
length and for rigidity category as described in equations (3) and (4), respectively:
Lengthi = α0 + α1Utilitiesi + α2Quasi regulatedi + Controlsi + εi (3)
Rigiditiesi,l = α0 + α1Utilitiesi + α2Quasi regulatedi + Controlsi + εi (4)
where i is the contract index, Utilitiesi is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the
contract i is a utilities contract and 0 otherwise, Quasi regulatedi is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 when the contract i is a quasi-regulated contract and 0 otherwise (thus when both
Utilitiesi and Quasi regulatedi equal zero, it is a private-to-private contract), Lengthi is the
length of contract i,17 and Rigidityi,l is the frequency of rigidity keywords clustered in clauses
l—arbitration, certification, evaluation, litigation, penalties, termination, and design as shown
in Table 1—conditional on contract i having a clause l (intensive margins), calculated as the
natural logarithm of the count of rigidity keywords divided by Length of file i:18
Rigidityi,l = ln
Count of keywords of rigidity clause l in file i
Lengthi
(5)
We controlled for total assets, capital expenditure, and sales; type of contract (license or
sale/procurement);19 and industry (one-digit SIC),20 state, and year fixed effects.21 We also
checked our results by filtering for long contracts only (without the low decile filings in length).
17 We proxied contract length by the geometric average of the count of the three most frequent words in
English—“the”, “and”, and “of”—to circumvent the different formats of the filings (which include meta tags
and formatting code) and to cut outliers.
18 The distributions of word count frequencies were positively (right) skewed and their interpretation in
absolute terms was convoluted. Log-transformed variables have a closer to normal distribution and their inter-
pretation as relative changes is apprehensible.
19 Although we cannot distinguish algorithmically between contracts for goods (for which the operative legal
regime—the Universal Commercial Code—is known and stable) and contracts for services, controlling for type
of contract alleviate this concern.
20 A one-digit SIC compares utilities and quasi-regulated companies with other industries within the same
SIC code starting with “4,” which are arguably closer to the analyzed groups.
21 State fixed effects take care of the default rules and general methods of contractual interpretation in
the US, namely: (a) courts can enforce contracts “as written” unless an ambiguity appears on the face of the
contract, as in the state of New York, or (b) the parties can introduce extrinsic evidence that an apparently
clear contract may be ambiguous or have a contested meaning, as in the state of California. Year fixed effects
correct for changes in the regulatory environment.
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We applied log transformations to normalize skewed and wide distributions as well as to provide
a straightforward interpretation of our coefficients in relative terms.
To prove Hypothesis 3, we run logit regressions of amendments on contract characteristics,
controlling for contract length, sales, and state fixed effects, as specified in equation (6), and
OLS regressions of the average number of amendments to total documents at the firm k level,
as specified in equation (7):
Amendmenti = α0 + α1Utilitiesi + α2Quasi regulatedi + α3Lengthi + Controlsi + εi (6)∑
iAmendmenti,k∑
iAmendmenti,k +
∑
iMaini,k
= α0 + α1Utilitiesi + α2Quasi regulatedi
+α3Lengthi + Controlsi + εi
(7)
In addition, we tested for rigidity clauses in amendments with analogous OLS equations
to equation (4), as shown in equation (8):
(Rigiditiesi,l | Amendmenti = 1) = α0 + α1Utilitiesi + α2Quasi regulatedi
+Controlsi + εi
(8)
V Empirical Results
We found that utility contracts are lengthier, have more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and
penalty clauses, and have more amendments with more arbitration, evaluation, and penalty
clauses than private contracts. Contracts in quasi-regulated industries are not significantly
lengthier, but in some cases incorporate more penalty and design clauses than private contracts.
Table 6 shows the unconditional mean lengths of public utilities, quasi-regulated, and
private contracts, and Table 7 shows the length mean-comparison t-test of public versus private
contracts. On average, public contracts are lengthier than private contracts by 19.4%.22
Table 8 presents results of OLS regressions of main contract length on contract attributes:
public utilities and quasi-regulated versus private industry dummies, controlling for industry
(one-digit SIC) fixed effects and excluding short filings (without the bottom 10% in terms of
length). When the filing entity is a public utility contracts tend to be ca. 25% lengthier. Also,
we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that contracts of quasi-regulated companies are
lengthier than private contracts.
22 Given our measure of contract length, an approximation the difference is e5.146447/e4.969246 − 1, where the
exponents are taken from the mean-comparison t-test presented in Table 7.
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Table 9 shows results of OLS regressions of rigidity clauses on contract characteristics.
Public utilities contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private contracts. In our general
specification, public contracts feature ca. 30% more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and
penalty clauses. Negative coefficients of contractual rigidity clauses are statistically insignifi-
cant.23
As our variables are log-transformed on both sides, length estimates show the length
elasticity of rigidity clauses. An increase in length is associated with more, but less frequent
appearances of, rigidity clauses.
The fact that design clauses do not appear to be statistically significant reinforces our
rationale and excludes possible contract tailoring: Too specific design could indicate “designa-
tive” or “tailored” specifications—that is, point to a specific contractor and be the source of
favoritism (Lambert-Mogiliansky and Kosenok 2009).
Tables 11 and 12 show that the likelihood of an amendment is 9.7% and 5.8% higher for
public utilities and companies in quasi-regulated industries, respectively, and that the average
number of amendments clustered at the company level is 7.2% higher for public utilities. Table
13 shows that amendments in public utilities contracts feature 12.7% more arbitration, evalu-
ation, litigation, and termination clauses than in private contract amendments. We conjecture
that public contracts are renegotiated formally through amendments instead of relationally.
VI Robustness Check: Flexibility Words
Flexible clauses shift the emphasis of the contractual relationship from a detailed specification
to adaptive terms in the face of changing circumstances (Goldberg 1976). Therefore, long-term
contracts (e.g., public utilities contracts) should show more flexible provisions to facilitate
efficient adjustments that subdue the costs of plausible opportunistic renegotiations (Crocker
and Masten 1991).
To compare this view with ours, we counted words that point to flexibility clauses: satis-
factory, timely, good faith, diligent, proper, reasonable, reasonably, and unreasonably.24 Next,
23 In unreported regressions with type of contract, state, and year fixed effects, and without short filings
(bottom 10%), evaluation, litigation, and penalty clauses remained highly significant and arbitration was close
to the 10% significance level.
24 We are thankful to Scott Masten for suggesting this test and set of words.
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we tested whether these clauses better explain the contractual differences between public and
private contracts.
Our sample covers commercial contracts related to ongoing business activities, of which
long-term agreements (e.g., the construction of a generation plant or natural gas supply for an
electric utility, as in Crocker and Masten 1991) are rear events. Table 10 presents results of
several regression specifications of flexibility words on contract characteristics. We found that
the covariates that determine contractual rigidity are uncorrelated with contractual flexibility.
Although on average public contracts contain 5% more flexibility clauses, the point estimates
are not statistically significant. Our results suggest that public and private contracts use
flexibility clauses in a similar way, but differ in rigidity terms. I.e., public and private contracts
are equally flexible to certain contingencies, but the former includes rule-based clauses that
reduce political risks.
VII Contractual Response to Political Contestability
If rigidity is a contractual adaptation to minimize third-parties challenges, then in the sub-
sample of public contracts rigidity should rise with political hazards.
Political contestability is the “extent to which a collective political actor or a system of
such political actors possesses attributes, resources, positions, or other factors, in themselves or
in their environments, that promote the ability to compete effectively in the political process”
(Mitnick 1993, 12). If a political system is characterized by contestability, then it is rational
for interest groups to petition the government on behalf of their members (Getz 1997). In fact,
in the U.S. and other democracies, interest groups do convey the concerns of their members to
government officials and, thus, are a means by which citizens can influence government (Mundo
1992).
A contract is politically contestable when contractual decisions are subject to influence
by potential (opportunistic) challengers.25 If the political opposition is fragmented (low ζ),
benefits from a challenge can go to any of the political competitors, not necessarily to the
challenger who bears the cost of challenge c in equation (2). Public agents will respond to
25 In Capitol Hill jargon, political contestability is usually referred to as the “Washington Post test,” a
commonly used phrase in D.C. when working on a project—“How would it look on the front page of the
Washington Post?”
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higher political contestability with higher contractual rigidity to reduce the likelihood of a
challenge (Moszoro and Spiller 2012).
Analogously to our previous hypotheses, we test within the regulated and quasi-regulated
contracts sample the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 In politically contestable markets, public contracts:
(a) are lengthier,
(b) have more rigidity clauses, and
(c) are renegotiated through formal processes and, thus, have more amendments
than in less politically contestable markets.
VIII Evidence of Political Contestability
We used the outcome of general elections for state governors to compute the measures of
political contestability that might affect public contracts.26 We assembled a dataset of general
gubernatorial elections from 1980 to 2013 for all 50 U.S. states from the CQ Voting and
Elections Collection (2014). The time span of the political series is larger to account for
cumulative swings in the governmental administration at the time of signing the contract.
Next, we interpolated the last election outcome for non-election years and merged the resulting
dataset with the subsample of public—utilities and quasi-regulated—contracts by state and
year. Finally, we added to the dataset a “year in office” variable equal to the difference between
the contract year and the last election year plus one, thereby defining the tenure of the governor
at the time of signing the contract.
We defined several complementary measures of political contestability:
Winning marginz,t = |Az,t −Bz,t| (9)
Small winning marginz,t =
{
1 if |Az,t −Bz,t| < λ
0 if else
(10)
where Az,t and Bz,t are the winning and runner-up parties’ vote shares respectively in district
z at time t, and λ is an a priori threshold for political contestability (usually 10% in the U.S.),
26 We are thankful to Jeremy Mayer and Edward Rhodes for their insights on the mechanisms of American
politics.
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all in percentage points. In addition:
Political opposition strengthz,t =
B2z,t + C
2
z,t +D
2
z,t + . . .
1−Az,t
(11)
which measures the strength of the political opposition using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of residual (non-winning) parties’ vote share weighted by the overall non-winning vote
share in general elections in district z at time t. We expect the winning margin coefficients to
be negative and the small winning margin and political opposition strength coefficients to be
positive.
Using public contracts, we tested Hypothesis 4 by running in-sample regressions using our
measures of political contestability:
Lengthi,t = α0 + α1PCi,t + Controlsi + εi,t (12)
Rigiditiesi,l,t = α0 + α1PCi,t + Controlsi + εi,t (13)
Amendmenti,t = α0 + α1PCi,t + α2Lengthi + Controlsi + εi,t (14)
(Rigiditiesi,l,t | Amendmenti,t = 1) = α0 + α1PCi,t + Controlsi + εi,t (15)
where i is the contract index, PCi,t are our political contestability variables (see equations
9–11) in contract i matched by the state code and year, and Lengthi and Rigidityi,l are as
defined in section IV. We control for type of contract and state fixed effects.
Table 14 presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of contract length in the sub-
sample of public contracts on political contestability variables. We found that public contract
length rises in political contestability when controlling for state fixed effects. As expected, win-
ning margins are inversely correlated with contract length and contract length increases when
winning margins are narrow (i.e., the winning margin is below 10%) and the concentration of
the political opposition is strong: an increase in one percent of the winning margin decreases
contract length by 1.1% and public contracts in jurisdictions where the winning margin was
narrow have lengthier contracts by 25.9%. The fact that political contestability variables are
significant only when controlling for state fixed effects might indicate that they have a strong
predicting power for time-varying political contestability within states, but not across states.27
27 The 16-year time period of our contracts sample overlaps with on average 4.4 governmental elections—
spanning from four elections for 36 states to eight elections in New Hampshire and Vermont, which hold govern-
mental elections every two years. Thus, we are confident that our political dataset captures sufficient within-state
political variation.
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Private contracts are typically negotiated on a different timeline than public contracts.
Also, public contracts may take years from bid to finished draft and may have operative
dates that post-date the date they were signed. But this lag can be played strategically. In
political practice, the first and second year in office are “warming-up years;” the third year
can be portrayed as the “working year” that will capitalize during the fourth and last year—
the “elections race year.” Accordingly, we found a significant increase in contract length in
governors’ third year of tenure in office, which might suggest that politicians are more careful
in crafting their contracts to avoid political challenges.
Tables 15 and 16 show the results of OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity
clauses in the subsample of public contracts on winning margins and winning margin dum-
mies. The data indicate that increased political contestability increases the frequency of the
appearance of arbitration and litigation clauses in public contracts: a one percent increase
in the winning margin decreases the frequency of these clauses by the same rate and states
where the winning margin was narrow show 31.6% and 23.4% more frequent arbitration and
litigation clauses, respectively. Interestingly, the political contestability effect is augmented
when we regress only those states where the Republican Party won by a narrow margin, as
shown in Table 17, panels A and B. This could suggest that the Republican Party is more
sensitive to political risks, while the Democratic Party is more concerned about the agenda.
In unreported regressions, we also checked the sum, time-weighted, and average of partisan
swings in the previous three elections at each year, as well as the winning margin squares for
non-linear effects, but found that these variables are not explanatory of public contracting
at the state level. We do not claim that our choice of political contestabiity variables is
unique across all administrations. The set of variables that capture political contestability
effects in a particular market may vary across countries and—within countries—across levels
of administration.
We did not find evidence, however, that public contracts show more amendments in polit-
ically contestable markets (see Table 18). Unfortunately, we were not able to link amendments
to contacts; therefore, we had to rely on the average number of amendments and average values
of political contestability, thereby losing the within-state time variability.
Our estimations looked at the effects of political contestability on public contracts only.
As a robustness check, we reran our regressions for private contracts only (see Table 19). We
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found that private contracts are significantly lengthier for only one variable in one specifi-
cation: winning margin with state fixed effects. However, the magnitude was economically
insignificant (less than 0.5% lengthier contracts when the winning margin increases by one
standard deviation) and the coefficient was positive (i.e., contrary to the expected). Therefore,
we reject the alternative hypothesis that a common factor affects state political contestability
and contract design (e.g., economic downturn).
IX Scope and Limitations of the Research
The presented results are robust to a series of tests controlling for corporate financials, state,
and length and type of document. They are also robust to alternative explanations: Flexibility
clauses and the subsample of private contracts do not show the same patterns as observed in
rigidity clauses and public contracts.
Our estimates may be driven by sector/industry specificity; for example, public utilities
contracts have more of certain rigidity clauses than private contracts. Furthermore, utilities
have been around longer and may have learned to contract differently to survive. In particular,
utility contracts are more likely than private firm contracts to be patterned, i.e., once a clause
(e.g., arbitration) is adopted by the industry-wide best-practices group, it is omnipresent.
It is precisely this evolution into contractual rigidities what we are trying to capture and
endogenize. Public contracts are subject to third-party challenges; consequently, public agents
have learned to minimize political hazards with contract rigidities. In addition, utilities show
higher contractual rigidity when compared to their peers in the one-digit SIC group “4000”
(see Table 8), i.e., arguably closer to sector/industry specificity.
Our results are, however, limited by the nature and sourcing of our data. Spiller (2008) and
Moszoro and Spiller (2012) developed a theory of higher rigidity of public contracts related to
similar goods/services procured by public versus private agents, whereas contracts filed in the
10-K of public utilities and private companies are not necessarily for similar goods/services. We
believe that the large sample of contracts in our collection reduces this object bias. A tenable
way to address this issue in future research could be—instead of dealing with large number
of heterogeneous contracts—to focus on a narrower, but homologous sample of contracts also
from the SEC’s Edgar system, for example: (a) contracts filed by large construction companies:
with government agencies versus private contractees; (b) contract for turbines filed by basically
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two producers—GE and Westinghouse—with utilities versus other buyers; and (c) contracts
with non-profit versus for-profit hospitals.
Contract complexity is correlated with the duration, geographical scope, and value of the
contracts. Due to data treatment constraints, we were not able to excerpt and control for these
variables, but somehow ameliorated these limitations through state and financial controls.
The results are also stained by two other implicit biases: subject and sample biases. As
for the subject bias, we identified contracts of public utilities as public contracts. Truly public
contracts would include procurement contracts from public agencies, government-sponsored
enterprises, and governments—municipalities, counties, states, and the federal government.
These institutions, however, do not file 10-Q and 10-K and their records are not standardized
and directly comparable.
As for the sample bias, we rely on contracts subject to Regulation S-K, which requires
publicly filing firms to disclose full contracts as exhibits to SEC filings if those contracts meet
materiality thresholds. It is important to note that the regulation is limited to publicly filing
firms (those with traded equities and debts) and is limited to filings that are deemed material
enough to meet disclosure standards. Also, it seems the SEC’s EDGAR—although large—is
not (yet) a comprehensive contract set. The small but still quantifiable ratio of unidentified
companies by CIK raises concerns about sample bias as well. We cannot rule out multiple
occurrences of the same contract.28 We assume, however, that the filings and our sample are
heterogeneous and representative of the whole contract population.
Contracting markets and political markets overlap only partially. Perfect overlapping
implies local administrative or natural monopolies. Our measures of political contestability are
determined by political districts, whereas contracting markets are given by the area covered
by the companies.
Conclusions from our algorithmic data reading and word clustering methodology may
differ by jurisdictions—between statutory and common law worlds, and within the common
law system—thereby limiting its potential applicability. We are confident that state fixed
effects take care of a significant part of state law differences.
Our final concern appears essentially impossible to address: public utilities may encase
28 For example, if Exxon sold coal to DTE Energy, the contract could show twice.
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unobservable characteristics that that lead them to utilize unusual contractual clauses, totally
unrelated to their publicness. Further research is needed to attend to this concern. Never-
theless, we believe that our study sheds light on the difference between public and private
contracts.
X Concluding Remarks
The results of our textual analysis show that public contracts are lengthier and feature more
arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and penalty clauses; in addition, their renegotiation is for-
malized in amendments with more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and termination clauses.
We further found that these patterns are reinforced in political contestability in the subsample
of public contracts.
Apart from the empirical results, our paper contributes to the literature in a threefold
manner:
(a) We provide a replicable methodology for the analysis of contracts. Textual analysis is a
young, but promising avenue of research. It enables the creation of novel datasets from
document libraries (i.e., plain text) to test a variety of contractual theories and bridge law
and economics research and practice.
(b) We construct dictionaries that are descriptive of the multidimentional characteristics of
public versus public contracts. These dictionaries can serve as a reference that can be
further developed and extended to other contractual characteristics.
(c) We advance a plausible rationale with testable hypotheses of the difference between public
and purely private contracts. Following Moszoro and Spiller (2012), we sustain that the
higher rigidity of public contracts is a political risk adaptation of public agents by which
they lower the likelihood of success of third-party (opportunistic) challengers. Our results
are consistent with this view.
Prospective research includes extending the analysis to other types of contracts (e.g.,
employment/compensation). On the methodology side, spacial analysis can be applied to
identify the separating hyperplane of public and private contracts.
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Appendix A Rigidity in Public Contracting at a Municipal
Utility29
Public agencies in the State of California follow the California Public Contract Code (PCC) for procurement
of materials and supplies, professional and general services, and construction contracts. The exact provisions of
the contract vary by type and by agency. Almost universally, materials and supplies are awarded on a low bid
basis, and professional and general services on a qualifications basis. The PCC has very limited applicability for
design-build contracting (contracts for construction that are awarded to a designer and contractor on a the basis
of a qualifications based construction process). Contracts must exceed a certain dollar threshold, be of a certain
type (buildings, certain public works), and follow guidelines for a selection process and then final reporting to
state agencies.
The letter and intention of the PCC are to provide for equity and fairness in contracting and eliminate
favoritism and collusion. To that end, public contracting procedures and contract documents contain provisions
to comply with these requirements and guiding principals.
Public utilities have contract templates that have been developed over a period of several decades. Those
utilities with active in-house design and contracting groups maintain their contract templates so that they
comply with current legal requirements.
A list of standard contractual features, which ensure fairness and minimize collusion and protests, is
presented below:
1. Public works construction contracts over a certain dollar threshold (in the case of the EBMUD, $70,000)
must be publicly advertised and bid. Bids are publicly opened in an agency’s board boom or similar
public room, after being stamped and dated in the agency’s purchasing division. Bids’ documents are
available for review by any interested party immediately after bid opening, and afterwards upon request.
Bid results are summarized and posted online within one business day.
2. Employees with a financial interest in a company cannot be involved in a selection process that involves
or potentially involves that company. Elected board officials cannot vote on contracts where they have
a financial involvement. All supervisors and managers whose job involves public procurement decisions
must file a Statement of Economic Interests annually with the Secretary of the District—this is a public
record, available for public review.
3. Bids are objective and compared based on a total bid cost. Bid exceptions are not allowed. To make
this possible, prescriptive specifications are developed to give clear, objective criteria on which bidders
can base their bid. On occasion, performance based specifications are used, but enough specificity is
provided to allow bidders to prepare a fixed price bid. Sole-source contracts are used on a very limited
basis and are only allowed in limited circumstances under the PCC. Internal procedures exist to evaluate
and approve the appropriateness of any sole-source specification. Regarding the bids themselves, official
bid forms must be used, which include:
(a) A bid form with line items including either lump sum or unit cost bid; line items such as “allowances”
are rarely used, and if used, it is in minor amounts with clear guidelines on how funds are to be
authorized—in writing, after receiving and reviewing an estimate, only for specific tasks, etc.
(b) A description of bid items, describing the basis for the evaluation of bids;
(c) A signed and notarized bidder’s bond;
(d) A signed and notarized proposal form, signed by an authorized agent of the company;
(e) A declaration on non-collusion;
(f) A declaration of eligibility to work on public works project;
(g) Designation of subcontracts; and
(h) Contract Equity program documents—usually specific to an agency, containing documentation of
compliance with any local, small, or minority- and/or women-owned business requirements.
29 We are grateful to Elisabeth Bialek for her firsthand insights into the practice of public contracting at
East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California.
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4. Bids are evaluated and reference documents checked, and ultimately formally awarded by the agency’s
regulating board:
(a) Bids can only be withdrawn in limited circumstances, as defined in the PCC (clerical error). This
ensures fairness and stops the case of bidders testing the waters with a low bid and withdrawing if
they find that they are significantly lower than other bidders.
(b) Bids with irregularities cannot be accepted (errors in bid documents that would allow a bidder to
withdraw cannot be accepted, even if the bidder does not withdraw).
(c) Insurance, performance bonds, and eligibility to work on public works projects are checked.
5. Contracts are administered by construction management professionals. To track progress, make appro-
priate payments, and ensure completion of the project and that it meets appropriate standards, the
following contract features are included:
(a) Payment and performance bonds for the full contract value
(b) Liability, workers compensation, and builders risk insurance (the latter only if applicable)
(c) Payment procedures, including requirements for schedule submittals, and documentation of charges,
including payment of prevailing wages (required for all public works contracts)
(d) Submittal procedures (for verifying if materials and equipment conform to specifications—prior to
ordering and installation)
(e) Construction inspection and independent materials testing
(f) Change order procedures (usually issued on a lump sum basis, based on a contractor quote, reviewed
and approved by an engineer, and signed off by a senior or manager, as appropriate for the amount of
the change order; time and materials/force account change orders are used in limited circumstances)
(g) Claims and dispute resolution procedures
(h) Liquidated damages procedures for unapproved delays in contract completion (raging from $1,000
to several thousands per day, depending on actual damages)
(i) Contracts are audited periodically
6. On higher-risk projects (higher risk due to cost, liability, and criticality of infrastructure), the following
procedures are sometimes included:
(a) Expanded evaluation of bidder’s and qualifications—in essence, a pre-qualification procedure. Con-
tractors are selected on a low-bid basis, but must meet more stringent qualifications requirements
(b) Higher insurance thresholds
(c) Escrow bid documents: contractors submit their actual bid documents to the awarding agency after
award; these are sealed by the contractor, stored in escrow, and only opened by both parties in the
presence of a third party in case of a dispute. This aids in the equitable resolution of disputes
(d) Higher liquidated damages (must be based on realistic estimates of damages)
(e) Alternate dispute resolution procedures, involving appointed resolution boards, binding or non-
binding arbitration, mediation, etc.
(f) Specific processing provisions for third-party claims
(g) Detailed pre-construction surveys on a property-by-property basis
Regarding cost specifics:
1. Typical planning, design, and construction management costs amount to 10–15 percent of the total
construction cost. These numbers vary based on job complexity and scale. Overall, smaller, more
complex jobs have higher design and administration costs on a percentage basis.
2. Actual change order percentages for contracts tend to be around 5 percent (EBMUD budgets for 5–10
percent).
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3. Protests on bids typically cost an agency $5,000–15,000, not including the differential cost to go to the
next lowest bid. If a protest raises questions that are legitimate enough to question the low bid, but
not definitive enough to reject the low bid without the risk of a counter-protest or further litigation, the
option of re-bid (re-advertise and solicit for new bids) is usually chosen. If a re-bid is required, costs
are $20,000–30,000, which does not include any possible increases in contract cost, even without scope
changes.
4. Bid amount or ultimate contract cost as compared to engineer’s estimate (EE) varies. The PCC requires
that agencies demonstrate that adequate funding is available for a public works project before it is
advertised. To comply with this, an in-house EE is prepared prior to advertising a project for award.
When bids are received, if there is more than a 10 percent deviation between the low bid and the EE,
the specifics are investigated. It is not uncommon to have a wider deviation. After an evaluation, if bids
are deemed reasonable, adequate funding exists, and the work is deemed necessary, projects are awarded,
even if they exceed the engineer’s estimate. Typical reasons for cost deviation are as follows:
(a) When multiple bids (more than 3 to 5) are received, costs tend to be lower.
(b) In crisis times—like the current economy—favorable bids are received for most projects, since private
sector work has significantly slowed over the past 2–3 years. In calendar years 2009–2010, bids on
average, were 18 percent below the EE. In calendar year 2011, bids, on average were 3 percent under
the EE. Part of this may reflect an improvement in the economy and more work available for bidders
(meaning less need to bid low on public works projects). Part may be due to the agency’s adjustment
of EE to reflect current market costs.
(c) It seems to be consistently difficult to estimate costs on projects with extensive electrical work,
instrumentation/controls or other technology projects, or work that the agency does not typically
bid out.
(d) Certain commodities’ costs fluctuate widely (e.g., concrete, metals), and so bids may be higher when
costs are up or expected to widely fluctuate for the duration of the project. Contractors bid high to
minimize their risk.
(e) Certain commodities have widely varying costs based on the quantity purchased (e.g., paving, fencing,
concrete).
(f) Certain services, such as rock, concrete, asphalt, and soil disposal, vary widely in cost and based on
local market. These services range in cost from free to being a revenue source or being a liability
with a high cost per ton for disposal.
(g) On occasion, elements may be underestimated or overestimated by the agency due to an error with
data or assumptions.
5. It is difficult to quantify costs for minimizing political risks. Agency projects are developed under the
California Environmental Quality Act, which requires public input into projects and the mitigation of
adverse effects. There is a political influence to shaping projects. Mitigation measures always add
costs to a project (tree re-plantings, habitat restoration, longer pipeline routings to minimize traffic
impacts, sound barriers, limited work hours, noise mitigations, etc.). These costs are scrutinized during
project development, and a balance is made between the need to minimize impacts and responsibly spend
public funds. Agencies may have internal guidelines for what constitutes appropriate and not excessive
mitigation measures.
24
References
Allen, D. and D. Lueck (1992). Contract choice in modern agriculture: Cash rent versus
cropshare. Journal of Law and Economics 35 (2), 397–426.
Allen, D. and D. Lueck (1993). Transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts.
RAND Journal of Economics 24 (1), 78–100.
Arrow, K. J. and G. Debreu (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy.
Econometrica 22 (3), 265–290.
Battigalli, P. and G. Maggi (2002). Rigidity, discretion, and the costs of writing contracts.
American Economic Review 92 (4), 798–817.
CQ Voting and Elections Collection (2014). CQ Press, Washington, D.C.
http://library.cqpress.com/elections/.
Crocker, K. J. and S. E. Masten (1988). Mitigating contractual hazards: Unilateral options
and contract length. RAND Journal of Economics 19 (3), 327–343.
Crocker, K. J. and S. E. Masten (1991). Pretia ex machina? Prices and process in long-term
contracts. Journal of Law and Economics 34 (1), 69–99.
Crocker, K. J. and K. J. Reynolds (1993). The efficiency of incomplete contracts: An em-
pirical analysis of Air Force engine procurement. RAND Journal of Economics 24 (1),
126–146.
Drahozal, C. R. and K. N. Hylton (2003). The economics of litigation and arbitration.
Journal of Legal Studies 32 (2), 549–584.
Drahozal, C. R. and S. J. Ware (2010). Why do businesses use (or not use) arbitration
clauses? Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 25 (2), 433–476.
Dye, R. A. (1985). Costly contract contingencies. International Economic Journal 26 (1),
233–250.
Getz, K. A. (1997). Research in corporate political action: Integration and assessment.
Business & Society 36 (1), 32–72.
Goldberg, V. P. (1976). Toward an expanded economic theory of contract. Journal of Eco-
nomic Issues 10 (1), 45–61.
Joskow, P. L. (1985). Vertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coal-burning
electric generating plants. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1 (1), 33–80.
Joskow, P. L. (1987). Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical
evidence from coal markets. American Economic Review 77 (1), 168–185.
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lafontaine, F. (1992). Agency theory and franchising: Some empirical results. RAND Jour-
nal of Economics 23 (2), 263–283.
Lafontaine, F. (1993). Contractual arrangements as signaling devices: Evidence from fran-
chising. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9 (2), 256–289.
Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. and G. Kosenok (2009). Fine-tailored for the cartel-favoritism in
procurement. Review of Industrial Organization 35 (1–2), 95–121.
25
Leffler, K. B. and R. R. Rucker (1991). Transactions costs and the efficient organization of
production: A study of timber-harvesting contracts. Journal of Political Economy 99 (5),
1060–1087.
Loughran, T. and B. McDonald (2011). When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis,
dictionaries, and 10-Ks. Journal of Finance 66 (1), 35–65.
Masten, S. E. and K. J. Crocker (1985). Efficient adaptation in long-term contracts: Take-
or-pay provisions for natural gas. American Economic Review 75 (5), 1083–1093.
Masten, S. E. and E. A. Snyder (1993). United States versus United Shoe Machinery Cor-
poration: On the merits. Journal of Law and Economics 36 (1), 33–70.
Matsumoto, D. A. (2002). Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises.
Accounting Review 77 (3), 483–514.
Mitnick, B. M. (1993). Political contestability. In B. M. Mitnick (Ed.), Corporate Political
Agency: The Construction of Competition in Public Affairs, pp. 11–66. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Moszoro, M. and P. T. Spiller (2012). Third-party opportunism and the nature of public
contracts. NBER Working Paper 18636, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mundo, P. A. (1992). Interest Groups: Cases and Characteristics. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Overdahl, J. A. (1991). A researcher’s guide to the contracts of firms filing with the SEC.
Journal of Law and Economics 34 (October), 695–701.
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost
examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal 36 (4), 794–829.
Schwartz, A. and R. E. Scott (2003). Contract theory and the limits of contract law. Yale
Law Journal 113, 541–619.
Schwartz, A. and R. E. Scott (2010). Contract interpretation redux. Yale Law Journal 119,
926–964.
Schwartz, A. and J. Watson (2004). The law and economics of costly contracting. Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (1), 2—31.
Schwartz, A. and J. Watson (2012). Conceptualizing contractual interpretation. Research
Paper 447, Yale Law & Economics.
Schwartz, A. and J. Watson (2013). Conceptualizing contractual interpretation. Journal of
Legal Studies 42 (1), 1–34.
Shavell, S. (2006). On the writing and the interpretation of contracts. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 22 (2), 289–314.
Spiller, P. T. (2008). An institutional theory of public contracts: Regulatory implications.
NBER Working Paper 14152, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Talley, E. and D. O’Kane (2012). The measure of a MAC: A machine-learning protocol
for analyzing force majeure clauses in M&A agreements. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 168 (1), 181–201.
26
Table 1: Keywords searched and grouped into contract rigidity categories
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation
arbitration, conciliation,
settlement, whereas30
certification, regulation obligation, quality,
scrutiny
dispute, indictment,
jury, litigation
Penalties Termination Design
fine, penalty, sanction dissolution, termination anticipation, planning,
scenario
Notes: Plurals (e.g., penaltiesT-statistics are in parenthesis) and variations (e.g., penalized) are also
counted.
Table 2: Keywords used for file subject identification and descriptive category grouping
Types of contract Keywords in file’s first 100 lines
Amendment amend, amended, amendment, and release, and restated, change in,
change of, modification agreement
Commercial contracts license, purchase, sale, supply
Compensation/Employ-
ment
award agreement, bonus plan, compensation, director stock, em-
ployee stock, employment, equity incentive, executive employment,
executive officer, executive retirement, incentive, indemnification
agreement, management agreement, management incentive, non-
employee director, of director, of executive, option agreement, option
grant, option plan, restricted stock, retention agreement, retirement
plan, savings plan, separation agreement, service agreement, services
agreement, settlement agreement, severance agreement, stock agree-
ment, stock award, stock incentive, stock option, stock plan, stock
purchase, supplemental executive, term incentive
Consulting consulting
Finance credit, lease, loan, pledge, promissory note, revolving
30See Schwartz and Watson (2012) for an explanation of the appropriateness of “whereas” as an arbitration
keyword.
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Table 3: Statistics for the dataset at each stage
Step Treatment Count
1 Readable filings 206,677
Filing companies 14,043
Average filings per company 15
Average filing length (geometric average of “the”, “and”, and “of”) 285
2 Sample industry diversity: identified different 4-code SIC 443
Dropped non-readable filings 3,670
Dropped files with no CIK or SIC codes identified 26,282
Dropped files SIC 6*** (Finance) and SIC 9*** (Administration) 32,982
Public utilities contracts (SIC 4900–4999) 11,657
Quasi-regulated industries contracts (SIC 4000–4499 & 4800–4899) 8,543
Total public contracts 20,200
Total private contracts 123,543
4 Keyword count overall 5,644,668
Arbitration 396,178
Certification 872,843
Evaluation 1,304,934
Litigation 289,750
Penalties 773,392
Termination 1,940,419
Design 67,152
5 Filings with identified categories (categories may overlap) 126,913
Amendment 96,552
Commercial contracts 54,344
Compensation/Employment 88,238
Consulting 4,559
Finance 50,492
Table 4: Breakdown of commercial contracts
Public Private Total
Main contracts 230 2,129 2,359
Amendments 659 4,172 4,831
Total 889 6,301 7,190
Notes: This table presents the breakdown of commercial contracts by main contracts and amendments
and by public or private filer, where a public filer is a public utility or a quasi-regulated company.
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Table 5: Summary statistics of the words counted in commercial contracts and amendments to com-
mercial contracts by contractual clauses
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Arbitration 7190 3.5 8.1 0 189
Certification 7190 7.9 14.4 0 228
Evaluation 7190 11.5 22.0 0 496
Litigation 7190 2.7 5.9 0 140
Penalties 7190 5.6 12.7 0 522
Termination 7190 12.0 18.3 0 439
Design 7190 0.5 1.4 0 38
Table 6: Summary statistics of contract length broken down by types of commercial contract
Type of commercial contract Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
License contracts
Length 12 4.7 1.6 1.6 7
Length 26 5.1 1.2 2.3 7.7
Length 611 5.1 1.4 .7 8.3
Sale/procurement contracts
Length 96 5.3 1.5 1.8 7.6
Length 96 5 1.4 1.8 7.9
Length 1518 4.9 1.4 .7 8.6
All contracts
Length 108 5.3 1.6 1.6 7.6
Length 122 5 1.4 1.8 7.9
Length 2129 5 1.4 .7 8.6
Notes: Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”.
Public contracts are public utility and quasi-regulated industry filings, and private contracts are the
remaining filings.
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Table 7: Public versus private length mean-comparison t-test
Filing company Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Public 230 5.146447 .0968425 1.468689 4.955631 5.337263
Private 2129 4.969246 .0302541 1.395955 4.909915 5.028576
Combined 2359 4.986523 .0289044 1.403875 4.929842 5.043203
Difference .1772009 .097393 -.013784 .3681858
Difference = mean(Public) – mean(Private) t = 1.8194
Ho: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 2357
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 6= 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9655 Pr(| T |>| t |) = 0.0690 Pr(T > t) = 0.0345
Notes: Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and
“of”. Utilities and quasi-regulated are contracts filed by a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry,
respectively; private contracts are the remaining filings.
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Table 8: Length of Public Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Length Length Length Length Length Length Length Length
Utilities 0.286∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.589∗ 0.252∗ 1.360∗∗∗ 0.213∗ 0.606∗
(2.07) (3.69) (2.15) (1.65) (1.73) (3.76) (1.76) (1.72)
Quasi-regulated 0.0806 1.121∗∗∗ 0.0181 0.359 0.0247 1.119∗∗∗ -0.0344 0.431
(0.62) (3.15) (0.17) (1.02) (0.19) (3.08) (-0.31) (1.23)
Assets Total 0.0170 0.00797 0.0242∗∗ 0.0679∗∗
(1.45) (0.20) (2.46) (1.99)
Constant 4.969∗∗∗ 3.929∗∗∗ 5.286∗∗∗ 4.945∗∗∗ 4.906∗∗∗ 3.867∗∗∗ 5.185∗∗∗ 4.458∗∗∗
(163.41) (11.95) (206.21) (14.85) (78.81) (8.53) (99.50) (10.90)
One-digit SIC No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Short contracts off No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2359 251 2109 224 2176 244 1951 217
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.045 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.044 0.005 0.026
Notes: This table presents results from cross-section OLS regressions of main contract length on contract attributes: public utilities and quasi-
regulated versus private industries. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Utilities and
quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Assets
total, capital expenditure, and sales equal the natural logarithm of these values in US$. Controls include: assets total, capital expenditure, sales,
industry (one-digit SIC) fixed effects, and excluding short filings (without bottom 10% in length). Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR database.
Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 9: Rigidity clauses in public contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation Penalties Termination Design
Utilities 0.368∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ -0.133 0.0810
(2.55) (1.98) (3.91) (4.34) (2.76) (-1.25) (0.76)
Quasi-regulated -0.137 0.0123 0.0494 -0.0223 0.0574 -0.0896 0.144
(-1.03) (0.14) (0.60) (-0.21) (0.74) (-0.95) (1.19)
Length -0.535∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.0667∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.754∗∗∗
(-16.64) (-8.17) (-3.76) (-17.94) (-21.58) (-14.18) (-28.89)
Assets Total -0.0180 -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0268∗∗∗ -0.0357∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0102
(-1.47) (-2.74) (-3.67) (-3.64) (5.16) (3.69) (0.98)
Constant -1.167∗∗∗ -2.917∗∗∗ -3.045∗∗∗ -1.760∗∗∗ -2.399∗∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗ -1.050∗∗∗
(-6.06) (-27.72) (-29.99) (-11.89) (-25.83) (-17.36) (-6.34)
Observations 1008 1552 1661 1044 1640 1664 487
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.048 0.020 0.262 0.233 0.112 0.632
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses on contract attributes: public versus
private and contract length. The frequency of each rigidity clause is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the count of rigidity
words divided by the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the
sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a
quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses;
∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
32
Table 10: Flexibility clauses in public contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility
Utilities 0.0468 0.0627 0.0770 0.0575 0.0240 0.0409 0.0556 0.0320
(0.64) (0.85) (0.99) (0.74) (0.34) (0.57) (0.73) (0.42)
Quasi-regulated -0.0778 -0.0721 -0.105 -0.102 -0.0671 -0.0612 -0.0913 -0.0897
(-1.12) (-1.04) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.00) (-0.91) (-1.30) (-1.28)
Length 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(7.81) (7.78) (7.94) (7.94) (11.68) (11.68) (11.16) (11.24)
Constant -3.576∗∗∗ -3.514∗∗∗ -3.592∗∗∗ -2.986∗∗∗ -3.941∗∗∗ -3.876∗∗∗ -3.861∗∗∗ -3.298∗∗∗
(-45.43) (-42.64) (-5.45) (-4.07) (-47.39) (-44.88) (-6.01) (-4.62)
Type of contract No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
Short contracts off No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1901 1901 1901 1901 1865 1865 1865 1865
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.034 0.067 0.074 0.068 0.071 0.093 0.101
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of flexibility clauses on contract attributes: public versus
private and contract length. The frequency of each flexibility clause is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the count of rigidity
words divided by the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the
sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a
quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Controls include state and year fixed effects. We excluded short filings (bottom 10% in length). Data are
from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at
5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 11: Likelihood of amendments of public contracts compared with private contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Amendments Amendments Amendments Amendments Amendments Amendments
Utilities 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0874∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0942∗∗∗
(4.35) (4.05) (3.58) (4.31) (4.04) (3.59)
Quasi-regulated 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗ 0.0525∗∗ 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗ 0.0538∗∗
(2.61) (2.58) (2.20) (2.59) (2.56) (2.18)
Length -0.00897∗∗ -0.00855∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.00900∗∗ -0.00857∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗
(-2.26) (-2.16) (-2.79) (-2.27) (-2.16) (-2.81)
Constant 0.706∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗
(34.64) (29.78) (3.95)
Type of contract No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7183
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.004 0.020
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.004 0.022
Notes: This table presents results OLS (models 1–3) and logit (models 4–6) cross-section regressions of the likelihood of an amendment for
public utilities, quasi-regulated industries, and private companies. The dependent variable equals one when a document is an amendment. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one when the filing is an amendment to a commercial contract. Utilities and quasi-regulated
are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Length is the natural
logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Controls include: length and type of contract and state fixed effects.
Marginal effects are reported for logit regressions (models 4–6). Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998–2013.
T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 12: Average number of amendments to public contracts compared with private contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends
Utilities 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.0576∗ 0.0620∗ 0.0809∗∗ 0.0846∗∗ 0.0548 0.0599∗
(2.63) (2.64) (1.70) (1.79) (2.43) (2.49) (1.62) (1.73)
Quasi-regulated 0.0360 0.0358 0.0147 0.0156 0.0349 0.0355 0.0146 0.0158
(1.20) (1.16) (0.48) (0.49) (1.17) (1.16) (0.47) (0.50)
Sales 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗
(5.39) (4.85) (5.04) (4.60)
Constant 0.656∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(87.77) (3.33) (41.33) (3.28) (46.46) (3.13) (32.79) (3.14)
Type of contract No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3799 3799 3412 3412 3799 3799 3412 3412
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.014
Notes: This table presents results from OLS regressions of the average number of amendments in public utilities, quasi-regulated industries,
and private companies. The dependent variable is the ratio of total number of amendments to total number of filings per company. Utilities and
quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Sales
the natural logarithm of sales in US$. Controls include: sales and type of contract (license or sale/procurement) and state fixed effects. Data
are from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance
at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 13: Rigidity clauses in public contract amendments compared with private contracts amendments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation Penalties Termination Design
Utilities 0.211∗ 0.0656 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0827 0.128∗∗∗ 0.110∗ -0.0593
(1.86) (1.13) (2.96) (1.01) (2.65) (1.71) (-0.81)
Quasi-regulated -0.110 -0.154∗∗∗ 0.0266 -0.125∗ 0.0963∗∗ -0.0256 0.0598
(-1.13) (-2.75) (0.50) (-1.73) (2.04) (-0.42) (0.74)
Length -0.599∗∗∗ -0.0611∗∗∗ -0.0618∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.805∗∗∗
(-24.61) (-4.54) (-5.26) (-21.72) (-36.94) (-17.81) (-47.79)
Constant -1.890∗∗∗ -3.048∗∗∗ -2.452∗∗∗ -0.642 -1.752∗∗∗ -1.755∗∗∗ -0.350
(-2.98) (-5.63) (-4.56) (-0.87) (-3.88) (-2.59) (-0.42)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1994 3137 3556 2119 3800 3527 1075
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.018 0.042 0.200 0.285 0.105 0.701
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses in public contract amendments compared
with private contract amendments. Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or
a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. Controls
include: length and and type of contract (license or sale/procurement), state, and year fixed effects. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR database.
Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 14: Political contestability effects on public contract length
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Length Length Length Length Length Length
Winning margin -0.00263 -0.0111∗∗
(-0.63) (-2.00)
Small winning margin 0.140 0.259∗∗
(1.40) (2.20)
Political opposition strength -0.134 1.719∗
(-0.22) (1.76)
1st year in office -0.0225 -0.0110 -0.0211 -0.00179 -0.0197 -0.0173
(-0.16) (-0.08) (-0.15) (-0.01) (-0.14) (-0.12)
2nd year in office -0.0232 0.0346 -0.0216 0.0353 -0.0239 0.0131
(-0.17) (0.24) (-0.16) (0.25) (-0.18) (0.09)
3rd year in office 0.282∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.341∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.315∗∗
(2.13) (2.39) (2.14) (2.50) (2.17) (2.31)
Constant 4.989∗∗∗ 4.864∗∗∗ 4.894∗∗∗ 4.552∗∗∗ 4.994∗∗∗ 4.157∗∗∗
(30.73) (7.82) (32.32) (7.25) (19.22) (5.85)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 842 842 842 842 842 842
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.073 0.005 0.074 0.003 0.072
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of public contract length on political contestability variables. Winning
margin is the difference between the winner’s and the runner-up’s share vote in percentage points; small winning margin is a variable equal to
one when the winning margin is narrow (below 10%); and political opposition strength is measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
of residual (non-winning) parties’ vote share in general elections weighted by the overall non-winning vote share in general elections. Controls
include: governor’s tenure in office, type of contract (license or sale/procurement), and state fixed effects. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR
database and the CQ Voting and Elections Collection. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at
10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
37
Table 15: Winning margin effect on public contract rigidity clauses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation Penalties Termination Design
Winning margin -0.00938∗ 0.00224 -0.00121 -0.0101∗∗∗ 0.00199 0.00196 0.00184
(-1.90) (0.86) (-0.43) (-2.94) (0.87) (0.64) (0.55)
Length -0.458∗∗∗ -0.0814∗∗∗ -0.0456 -0.311∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗∗
(-8.34) (-3.02) (-1.59) (-7.26) (-12.92) (-8.65) (-21.23)
Constant -1.491∗∗∗ -3.646∗∗∗ -3.043∗∗∗ -2.597∗∗∗ -2.442∗∗∗ -1.841∗∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗
(-4.24) (-20.78) (-16.68) (-9.56) (-17.73) (-9.90) (-3.01)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 576 626 380 678 629 243
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.034 0.012 0.135 0.197 0.112 0.666
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses in public contracts on winning margins.
Winning margin is the difference between the winner’s and the runner-up’s share vote in percentage points. Length is the natural logarithm of
the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. We control for type of contract (license or sale/procurement). Data are from the
SEC’s EDGAR database and the CQ Voting and Elections Collection. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes
significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 16: Winning margin dummies effect on public contract rigidity clauses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation Penalties Termination Design
Small winning margin 0.316∗∗∗ -0.0691 0.0921 0.234∗∗∗ 0.0512 0.0757 -0.0946
(2.83) (-1.11) (1.36) (2.77) (0.94) (1.01) (-1.16)
Length -0.463∗∗∗ -0.0824∗∗∗ -0.0473∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗
(-8.50) (-3.06) (-1.66) (-7.17) (-13.02) (-8.79) (-21.47)
Constant -1.734∗∗∗ -3.579∗∗∗ -3.090∗∗∗ -2.867∗∗∗ -2.420∗∗∗ -1.820∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗
(-5.27) (-21.13) (-17.86) (-10.85) (-18.34) (-10.32) (-3.08)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 576 626 380 678 629 243
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.035 0.015 0.133 0.197 0.113 0.667
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses in public contracts on winning margin
dummies. Winning margin is the difference between the winner’s and the runner-up’s share vote in percentage points. Length is the natural
logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. We control for type of contract. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR
database and the CQ Voting and Elections Collection. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at
10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 17: Winning margin dummies effect on public contract rigidity clauses by political party
Panel A: Democratic States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation Penalties Termination Design
Small winning margin 0.0849 0.0606 -0.0907 0.110 0.0742 0.0220 -0.184
(0.54) (0.65) (-0.86) (0.90) (0.88) (0.20) (-1.15)
Length -0.465∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.0704 -0.246∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗∗
(-5.39) (-3.31) (-1.44) (-3.80) (-8.44) (-6.81) (-11.48)
Constant -1.561∗∗∗ -3.326∗∗∗ -2.818∗∗∗ -3.170∗∗∗ -2.365∗∗∗ -1.371∗∗∗ -0.520
(-3.05) (-12.50) (-9.43) (-8.03) (-10.90) (-5.03) (-1.09)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 149 247 251 155 291 268 89
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.061 0.013 0.099 0.194 0.164 0.608
Panel B: Republican States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Arbitration Certification Evaluation Litigation Penalties Termination Design
Small winning margin 0.548∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.0593 0.118 -0.0825
(3.49) (-2.42) (2.19) (3.22) (0.81) (1.10) (-0.90)
Length -0.477∗∗∗ -0.0310 -0.0439 -0.358∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗
(-6.81) (-0.89) (-1.25) (-6.31) (-9.95) (-5.95) (-18.78)
Constant -1.777∗∗∗ -3.825∗∗∗ -3.183∗∗∗ -2.597∗∗∗ -2.442∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗∗ -0.879∗∗∗
(-4.10) (-17.13) (-14.90) (-7.25) (-14.67) (-9.14) (-3.36)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 193 329 375 225 387 361 154
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.029 0.018 0.165 0.200 0.083 0.714
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses in public contracts on winning margin
dummies by political party. Winning margin is the difference between the winner’s and the runner-up’s share vote in percentage points when the
Democratic Party (panel A) or the Republican Party (panel B) won the election race. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average
of the sum of “the”, “and”, and “of”. We control for type of contract. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR database and the CQ Voting and
Elections Collection. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗
significance at 1%.
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Table 18: Political contestabilty effects on average amendments in public contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends Avg. Amends
Avg. winning margin 0.00150 0.000790
(0.72) (0.28)
Avg. winning margin dummy -0.0638 -0.0595
(-1.41) (-1.07)
Avg. political opposition strength 0.154 0.701
(0.51) (1.36)
Sales 0.0113 0.00814 0.0121 0.00864 0.0119 0.00826
(1.33) (0.85) (1.43) (0.90) (1.40) (0.87)
Constant 0.602∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.429
(8.61) (3.15) (9.92) (3.37) (4.29) (1.54)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360
Adjusted R2 0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.000
Notes: This table presents results from OLS regressions of total amendments to total documents per public company on political contestability
variables. Average amendments is the ratio of the total number of amendments to total number of filings per public company. Average winning
margin is the difference between the average of the winner’s and the runner-up’s share vote in percentage points; average small winning margin
is a the average of the dummy variable equal to one when the winning margin is narrow (below 10%); and average political opposition strength
is measured as the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of residual (non-winning) parties’ vote share in general elections weighted
by the overall non-winning vote share in general elections. Controls include: the natural logarithm of sales in US$ and type of contract (license
or sale/procurement) and state fixed effects. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in
parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at 10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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Table 19: Political contestability effects on private contract length
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Length Length Length Length Length Length
Winning margin 0.00131 0.00450∗∗
(0.75) (2.06)
Small winning margin -0.0577 -0.0604
(-1.58) (-1.42)
Political opposition strength 0.0160 -0.0829
(0.06) (-0.21)
1st year in office -0.0270 -0.0284 -0.0276 -0.0350 -0.0298 -0.0374
(-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.66) (-0.57) (-0.71)
2nd year in office 0.0849∗ 0.0848 0.0842 0.0802 0.0835 0.0794
(1.65) (1.64) (1.64) (1.55) (1.62) (1.54)
3rd year in office -0.0660 -0.0633 -0.0668 -0.0638 -0.0659 -0.0637
(-1.33) (-1.27) (-1.35) (-1.28) (-1.33) (-1.28)
Constant 5.025∗∗∗ 5.451∗∗∗ 5.066∗∗∗ 5.547∗∗∗ 5.038∗∗∗ 5.537∗∗∗
(93.47) (8.75) (102.54) (8.90) (44.57) (8.58)
Type of contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5979 5979 5979 5979 5979 5979
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.011
Notes: This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of private contract length on political contestability variables. Winning
margin is the difference between the winner’s and the runner-up’s share vote in percentage points; small winning margin is a variable equal to
one when the winning margin is narrow (below 10%); and political opposition strength is measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
of residual (non-winning) parties’ vote share in general elections weighted by the overall non-winning vote share in general elections. Controls
include: governor’s tenure in office, type of contract (license or sale/procurement), and state fixed effects. Data are from the SEC’s EDGAR
database and the CQ Voting and Elections Collection. Sample period is 1998–2013. T-statistics are in parentheses; ∗ denotes significance at
10%, ∗∗ significance at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significance at 1%.
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